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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-1011
_____________
CHRISTY JACKSON,
Appellant
v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, INC.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 2-09-cv-00386)
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on July 12, 2012
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 18, 2012)

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Christy Jackson appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to her
employer, Temple University Hospital, Inc. (Temple Hospital), on her claims against it
1

alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 2000e-17. Jackson claims that Temple Hospital terminated her employment because she
is African American and in retaliation for her complaining of racially discriminatory
treatment in the workplace. We find that there is no genuine issue of material fact in
relation to either of these claims and that the hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on them. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
From 1988 to 2007, Jackson worked as a secretary in the Department of
Respiratory Care at Temple Hospital. In the second half of 2006, the hospital’s corporate
parent, Temple University Health System, Inc. (Temple Health System) incurred
significant monetary losses and, in response, sought to reduce operating costs. To this
end, it decided to conduct a system-wide reduction in force. In implementing this
measure at Temple Hospital, it was determined that the positions that had the least impact
on patient care and that involved duties that could be assumed by other employees would
be the ones that would be eliminated.
Responsibility for initially identifying such positions within the Respiratory Care
Department fell to John Mullarkey, who was Director of Respiratory Care and also
Jackson’s direct supervisor. This department had 50 employees, and Mullarkey selected
for potential elimination the only two positions which did not require state certification in
respiratory care – Jackson’s secretarial position and an equipment technician position.
Mullarkey discussed these possible reductions with his direct supervisor, Cecilia
Pemberton, Administrative Director of the Lung Center. She ultimately recommended to
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her own supervisor, Sandra Gomberg, Associate Hospital Director, that Jackson’s
position, but not the equipment technician position, be eliminated.
Gomberg approved this recommendation in January 2007, and on January 29,
2007, Jackson’s position was included on the Temple University Health System
Remediation Plan, a document listing all positions that would be eliminated. Jackson’s
name continued to appear on all subsequent revised versions of this document until the
reduction in force was officially implemented. That occurred on February 16, 2007,
when 450 positions were eliminated system-wide. The reduction encompassed 34
positions at Temple Hospital, among which was Jackson’s.
On January 28, 2009, Jackson filed this lawsuit against Temple Hospital in which
she alleged that her employment was terminated because she is African American, in
violation of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a),
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981. She also claimed that her
employment was terminated in retaliation for her sending a letter to Temple University’s
Office of Affirmative Action on February 2, 2007, complaining about allegedly racially
discriminatory treatment, in violation of the same two statutes.1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The District Court granted summary judgment on both of these
claims to Temple Hospital on December 1, 2010, and Jackson now appeals.

1

Jackson also initially raised a claim under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. She abandoned that claim in the District Court, and it is not
relevant to this appeal.
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II. DISCUSSION
The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over Jackson’s claims based on
28 U.S.C. § 1331. We do the same with respect to her appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2004). We must accordingly
determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact in relation to Jackson’s
claims and whether Temple Hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Because both claims are based on circumstantial rather than direct evidence, this
analysis must be conducted according to the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192
F.3d 378, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1999). Under that framework, a plaintiff bears an initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802. If this is accomplished, the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the alleged violation. Id. “[S]hould the
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.,
198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). These last two steps of the analysis
need not be addressed here, however, because Jackson fails to make out a prima facie
case of either claim.
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A. Discrimination
To establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination under Title
VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified
for the position she sought to retain or attain, (3) she was subjected to an adverse
employment action, and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference that the adverse action was taken on account of her membership in the
protected class. See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). To satisfy the
fourth element of the prima facie case where, as here, the basis of a plaintiff’s claim is an
employment termination conducted in the context of a reduction in force, she must
present evidence that similarly situated persons outside of her protected class were
retained. See In Re: Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 294-95 (3d Cir. 1997);
Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006); Anderson v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2002). Jackson, however, failed to do so.
She argues that a document in the record known as a “remediation summary”
establishes that ten similarly situated employees who were not African American were
retained. That document, however, does not include any information on those employees’
race or ethnicity, and thus fails to substantiate her claim. She also cites a document
summarizing the impact of the reduction in force on non-bargaining employees of six
different racial groups. As an initial matter, Jackson is not a non-bargaining employee,
meaning that this document relates to a population of which she is not a member and
consequently cannot be deemed to pertain to similarly situated employees. Moreover,
though it can be deduced from this document that non-bargaining Temple Hospital
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employees who were not African American were retained, the document only categorizes
employees into seven broad groups and is therefore insufficiently detailed to establish
that any of those employees was similarly situated to Jackson. There is thus no evidence
in the record showing that employees who were similarly situated to Jackson and who
were not African American were retained in the reduction in force. She accordingly has
not made out a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination, and Temple
Hospital is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
B. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie claim of unlawful retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must show that (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) her employer took
an adverse action against her, and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action. See Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 34041 (3d Cir. 2006). Jackson claims that her employment was terminated in retaliation for
her sending a letter to Temple University’s Office of Affirmative Action complaining of
racially discriminatory treatment. It is undisputed that this letter was sent on February 2,
2007. Evidence in the record, though, such as the Temple University Health System
Remediation Plan and declarations of Mary Beth Oberg and Sandra Gomberg, shows that
the decision to terminate Jackson’s position was already made in January 2007. Jackson
fails to contradict this evidence. There is accordingly no genuine dispute that the
decision to eliminate her position was made before she mailed her letter to the Office of
Affirmative Action. Based on this sequence, she cannot establish a causal connection
between the termination of her employment and her sending that letter. As a result, she
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fails to make a prima facie case that the termination constituted unlawful retaliation, and
Temple Hospital was entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 2
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Jackson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are governed by standards identical to those
applicable to her Title VII claims. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410
(3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, based on our preceding analysis, Temple Hospital is also
entitled to summary judgment on Jackson’s § 1981 claims.
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